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IF THE QUESTION IS CHOCOLATE-
RELATED, THE ANSWER IS ALWAYS YES:
WHY DOE V NESTLE REOPENS THE DOOR
FOR CORPORATE LIABILITY OF U.S.
CORPORATIONS UNDER THE ALIEN
TORT STATUTE
AMANDA A. HUMPHREVILLE*
Corporate liability for U.S. corporations that commit violations of
international norms overseas is a contentious issue among several circuit
courts. Because the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
overlooked the corporate liability question and instead applied the presumption
against extraterritoriality to the Alien Tort Statute, many circuit courts use
this presumption as a bright-line rule, precluding corporate liability of U.S.
corporations where the alleged conduct does not occur in the United States.
However, corporate liability and the presumption against extraterritoriality
are distinct analyses. The Ninth Circuit recognized this in Doe I v. Nestle
U.S.A., Inc. when it iterated a corporate liability analysis to be applied
separately, but in addition to, the analysis of where the conduct occurred. The
court created a norm-by-norm liability analysis that evaluates the specific norms
alleged to have been violated to determine if they are applicable to corporations.
The corporate liability analysis ensures that corporations are not given special
treatment, that the United States does not become a safe harbor for violators, and
that the reasons for passing the Alien Tort Statute are not subverted. Importantly,
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the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm analysis shows that international norms are
applicable to corporations and gives plaintzffs hope of recovery.
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INTRODUCTION
In the Ivory Coast, armed guards kept three children, all between
the ages of twelve and fourteen, captive on cocoa farms, subjecting
them to physical violence and unceasing psychological
abuse. Constantly threatening the children with beatings using whips
and tree branches, making the children drink urine, and cutting
open the feet of those who tried to escape, their captors scared the
child-slaves into staying on the farms. For fourteen long hours, six
days a week, armed guards forced these children, as well as others as
young as six years old, to cut, gather, and dry cocoa beans-back-
breaking work that exposed them to extremely dangerous tools and
chemicals. The underfed children received no reprieve at night
when their captors forced them sleep in rooms crowded with other
children. The cocoa beans the farmers forced the children to harvest
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wound up in the hands of Nestle U.S.A., the corporation that
provides the supports necessary to carrying out this injustice.
Although Nestle U.S.A. is perpetuating child slavery in the Ivory
Coast,' certain U.S. courts would not hold Nestle liable simply
because the child slavery is occurring outside of the United States.
As a result of a recent trend in circuit court holdings, U.S.
corporations frequently escape liability for committing crimes such as
child slavery and apartheid simply by virtue of incorporating in the
United States and committing these crimes overseas. In Cardona v.
Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc.,' Chiquita allegedly reviewed, approved, and
concealed money and weapons transfers to Colombian paramilitary
groups with the intent that these groups would use them to commit
war crimes.' Yet, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
did not hold Chiquita liable and dismissed the plaintiffs' claim
because the court believed the conduct was not sufficiently
connected to the United States. Similarly, in Balintulo v. Daimler
A.G., Ford and IBM allegedly engaged in workplace discrimination
that mimicked apartheid and transferred supplies to the South
African government for use in carrying out apartheid.' Ford and
IBM were not held liable, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit dismissed the case because the court also believed the
conduct was not sufficiently connected to the United States.'
Unlike the plaintiffs in Chiquita and Balintulo, the plaintiffs in Doe I
v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc.,' three victims of child slavery, have a chance of
succeeding. The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) is a jurisdictional statute,
giving federal jurisdiction over violations of international law while
1. Nestle and its co-defendants dominate the international cocoa industry
through exclusive buy-sell relationships with Ivory Coast farms, where young children
are forced into slavery to cultivate the cocoa. Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d
1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2014). Through these relationships, Nestle effectively controls
the production of Ivorian cocoa by providing financial and technical support to the
farms and visiting several times per year. Id. Nestle was reportedly aware of the child
slavery through international organizations' reports and its visits to the farms;
however, Nestle continued to supply money, equipment, labor, and training despite
knowing it would all be used to continue the practice of forced child labor. Id.
Nestle even lobbied against congressional efforts to stop child labor, effectively
guaranteeing the continued use of the cheapest labor available to produce cocoa-
child slavery. Id. at 1017-18.
2. 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014).
3. Id. at 1194.
4. 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
5. Id. at 179-80.
6. Id. at 194.
7. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
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authorizing judicial recognition of a limited number of federal
common law causes of action for violations of international law.' The
Supreme Court's application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality' in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.'o led some
lower courts to preclude corporate liability under the ATS. However,
the Nestle plaintiffs may be able to win their case because the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has since interpreted Kiobel as
allowing corporate liability under the ATS.
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to a Second Circuit
decision that dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint against foreign
defendant-corporations alleging they aided and abetted the Nigerian
government in violating the law of nations." The Second Circuit
dismissed the plaintiffs' case based on its conclusion that the ATS
does not confer jurisdiction over claims against corporations, and
that, therefore, corporations are not subject to liability under the
ATS." While the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider
corporate liability under the ATS, the Court ultimately disregarded
the question but for a brief mention at the conclusion of the majority
opinion." Instead, the Court affirmed the Second Circuit's decision
based on " [w] hether and under what circumstances the ATS allows
courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law of
nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States."" After analyzing the ATS through the presumption
against extraterritoriality" and concluding that an ATS claim may not
concern conduct occurring in another country, the Supreme Court
stated that even where a claim touches and concerns the United
States, "It must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption.
8. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
9. See infra note 15 (explaining the presumption against extraterritoriality).
10. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
11. See infra note 46 (explaining that the law of nations is a body of law
determined from the customs and practices of civilized nations and includes
prohibitions against universally accepted crimes such as genocide and slavery).
12. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
13. See id. at 1669 (stating that "mere corporate presence" in the United States
does not "touch and concern" U.S. territory sufficiently to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality when all relevant conduct occurs abroad; therefore, in such
a situation, there can be no corporate liability).
14. Id. at 1663.
15. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a statutory canon of
interpretation providing that a statute has no extraterritorial application when it
does not clearly indicate application to U.S. conduct abroad. Id. at 1664.
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against extraterritorial application,"" and "mere corporate presence""
does not suffice. The Court did not expand on this language. While
Kiobel established that foreign corporations cannot be sued in federal
courts for misconduct occurring abroad, it left open the question of
whether U.S. corporations may be held liable under the ATS for
conduct that occurs outside the United States.
Consequently, Kiobel led to a circuit split based on this unresolved
issue-whether U.S. corporations may be held liable under the ATS
for conduct occurring abroad. Some circuits have found that
corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS because they
understood Kiobel's application of the presumption against
extraterritoriality to mean that no U.S. corporate liability for overseas
conduct exists under the ATS." Although they are divided in their
approaches, other circuits have held that corporations can be held
liable under the ATS for extraterritorial violations of international
norms." Notably, in finding corporate liability under the ATS, the
Ninth Circuit developed a corporate liability analysis separate to any
discussion of the presumption against extraterritoriality.
16. Id. at 1669.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 15 (explaining the presumption against extraterritoriality).
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that presence in the
United States-as in Kiobel-and being a U.S. corporation-as in Chiquita-made no
difference and, as a result, being domestically incorporated does not sufficiently
touch and concern the United States to dislodge the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit found that the ATS does not
apply extraterritorially. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189
(11th Cir. 2014). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded
similarly, stating that because the alleged violations of the law of nations occurred
outside the United States, the defendant-corporations cannot be liable under the
ATS. Balintulo v. Daimler A.G., 727 F.3d 174, 188 (2d Cir. 2013).
19. See infra Part I.C.2 (explaining that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit resolved the case using the presumption against extraterritoriality as applied
to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), whereas the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit developed and applied a norm-by-norm analysis to determine corporate
liability under the ATS); see also infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text (describing
the norm-by-norm analysis). Like the Second and Eleventh Circuits, the Fourth
Circuit, in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., focused on the presumption
against extraterritoriality in its liability analysis. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014)
(holding that the plaintiffs' ATS claim of abuse and torture in Abu Ghraib prison by
a U.S. military contractor sufficiently touched and concerned U.S. territory to rebut
the presumption against extraterritoriality). However, unlike the Second and
Eleventh Circuits, the court concluded that the defendant-U.S. corporation could be
held liable under the ATS because its extraterritorial conduct sufficiently touched
and concerned the United States.
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As evidenced by Chiquita, Balintulo, and Al Shimari v. CACI Premier
Technology, Inc.,20 attention post-Kiobel is focused on when the
presumption against extraterritoriality may apply. The original
question of corporate liability under the ATS, however, has been
largely ignored. The only circuit court to address the corporate
liability analysis separately from the presumption against
extraterritoriality is the Ninth Circuit. In reaffirming its reasoning
from Sarei v. Rio Tinto, P.L.C., 2 1 the Ninth Circuit established a norm-
by-norm analysis to determine whether domestic corporations may be
held liable for claims of violations of international legal norms under
the ATS. The court separated its analysis of an ATS claim into two
parts: whether international norms can provide the basis for ATS
claims against corporations and whether the presumption against
extraterritoriality from Kiobel bars recovery under those claims.
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm
analysis of whether international norms apply to corporations, as well
as to other groups, is the correct approach, ultimately allowing for
the possibility of holding U.S. corporations liable for violations of
international norms. The idea that corporations are not liable under
the ATS unless violations of international norms occur in the United
States by U.S. corporations provides incentives for corporations to
incorporate elsewhere and to move their operations abroad. Such a
loophole in an important statute raises the very concerns for which
the ATS was enacted: foreign policy conflicts with other nations.
Therefore, rather than adopting a bright-line rule based on the
presumption against extraterritoriality detailing when corporations
can and cannot be liable under the ATS, which might prevent
recovery, this Comment recommends that the nature and scope of
each norm alleged should be analyzed to determine whether that
norm extends to U.S. corporations.
Part I of this Comment will provide a history of the ATS before
Kiobel and will explain Kiobets impact on ATS litigation in terms of
the differing opinions from the circuit split that followed. Part I will
also provide a brief overview of the current state of the ATS. Part II
of this Comment will argue that a norm-by-norm analysis of
international norms should be adopted when determining whether
20. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
21. 671 F.3d 736, 765 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995
(2013) (holding that, for an ATS claim of genocide and war crimes, each claim
should be analyzed to determine whether corporations are subject to the
international norms underlying that claim).
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claims may be brought under the ATS and that jurisdiction for U.S.
corporate liability should arise under the ATS, rather than
complicating such litigation with other sources of law. Additionally,
Part II will contend that the credible, possible consequences of
letting U.S. corporations evade liability through the use of a bright-
line rule, such as that adopted by the Second and Eleventh Circuits,
outweigh the ease of such a rule. Finally, Part III will recommend
that courts keep consistent with the notion of the universality of
international norms by using the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm
analysis. Finding that universally applicable norms provide the basis
for ATS claims against U.S. corporations for conduct abroad will
ensure that U.S. corporations are not given special treatment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Alien Tort Statute Before Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
The Alien Tort Statute states: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."" The
ATS is jurisdictional, giving federal courts the ability to adjudicate
alleged violations of international law, but it does not give rise to causes of
action." It does, however, authorize judicial recognition of federal
common law causes of action for violations of international norms.
For over thirty years, lower courts interpreted the ATS as giving rise
to a remedy for international law violations." Regarded as the
leading interpretation of the ATS since 1980, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala"
22. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); see infra note 46 (explaining that
the law of nations is a body of law determined from the customs and practices of
civilized nations and includes prohibitions against universally accepted crimes such
as genocide and slavery).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350; Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004) (clarifying
that, because the ATS is ajurisdictional statute, as evidenced by its text and placement in
section 9 of the Judiciary Act, it does not create statutory causes of action).
24. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713; see Doug Cassell, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts
Overseas: The Supreme Court Ieaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1773, 1774 (2014)
(noting that the international norms must be universally accepted and defined).
25. See Robert C. Bird et al., Corporate Voluntarism and Liability for Human Rights in
a Post-Kiobel World, 102 KY. L.J. 601, 604-05 (2014) (explaining that before the
1980s, the ATS was not often litigated, citing only four court opinions and two
opinions of the U.S. Attorney General to have addressed ATS issues).
26. 630 F.3d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving Paraguayan citizens who applied
for permanent political asylum in the United States and filed an ATS claim of torture
against another Paraguayan citizen in the United States on a visitor's visa).
198 [Vol. 65:191
IF THE QUESTION IS CHOCOLATE-RELATED
held that, regardless of nationality, enabling deliberate torture under
color of authority-or acting with authority when, in reality, the actor
has no authority-violates universal norms of the international law of
human rights.27 Therefore, federal jurisdiction was provided under
the ATS whenever an alleged torturer was sued in the United States.28
The Supreme Court bolstered, but also limited, this widely-held
interpretation in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.2  Sosa reaffirmed that the
ATS is a jurisdictional statute providing federal jurisdiction for a
limited number of federal common law causes of action arising from
violations of international law."o Even though Sosa limited the reach
of the ATS by emphasizing that the ATS does not make all violations
of international law actionable," the lower courts' views did not
change, and the ATS continued to be broadly applied."
B. Kiobel and the Newly Restricted ATS
Originally, the Supreme Court agreed to decide Kiobel on the issue
of corporate liability" but ultimately it did not even address that
question." The Court unanimously held that a presumption of
27. Id. at 878.
28. Id.
29. 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004) (resolving that respondent Alvarez-Machain's claim
under the ATS that the Drug Enforcement Administration initiated his abduction from
Mexico for a criminal trial in the United States could not stand because the ATS does not
create a cause of action for alleged violations of the law of nations under the ATS).
30. Id. at 724.
31. Id. at 725 (stating that claims based on the current law of nations must "rest on
a[n international] norm ... accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms [(violation of safe conducts,
infringement of ambassadors' rights, and piracy)] we have recognized").
32. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that the prohibition of medical experimentation on human subjects without their
consent is a norm of customary international law, the violation of which creates a
cause of action under the ATS); Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., 416 F.3d
1242, 1246, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2005) (allowing Guatemalan labor unionists to sue a
Guatemalan banana plantation for its participation in state-sanctioned torture under the
ATS and noting that new causes of action may be recognized under the ATS as time goes
on); Doe v.. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1157 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (declaring that state-
sanctioned assassination is a crime against humanity, which is an international norm, the
violation of which gives rise to a cause of action under the ATS).
33. The Second Circuit had dismissed the case based on its understanding that
the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013).
34. Id.
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extraterritoriality15 applies to the ATS and therefore bars claims by
foreign nationals against foreign corporations for violations of the law
of nations occurring in a foreign country. 6 The Court made three
major rulings. First, the presumption against extraterritoriality
provides that when a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none, and it is applied to determine
whether an Act of Congress regulating conduct applies abroad."
Second, to make a claim under the ATS, the alleged violation must
have definite content and be accepted among civilized nations, and
the violations alleged must be specific, universal, and obligatory for
federal courts to hear such cases." And third, to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality, the statute must show a clear
indication of extraterritoriality; however, the Court held that the ATS
does not make such a showing.3 9
Given Kiobel's particular facts, the Supreme Court focused on the
location of the alleged conduct rather than on the identity of the
perpetrator.40 The defendant, Shell Petroleum Development
Company of Nigeria ("Shell") was a joint subsidiary of the Royal
Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell Transport and Trading
Company, incorporated in Nigeria."1 Residents protested the
environmental effects of Shell's work in Ogoniland, and in response,
Shell obtained the help of the Nigerian government to suppress the
demonstrations." Nigerian police and military did so violently; they
attacked villages by beating, raping, killing, and arresting residents, as
well as destroying and looting property. 3
The plaintiffs, residents of Ogoniland, alleged that Shell and its
parent companies aided and abetted the Nigerian government in
committing these acts by providing Nigerian forces with food,
35. The presumption against extraterritoriality is applied to determine whether
U.S. statutes regulating conduct apply abroad and provides that U.S. statutes are
presumed to have no extraterritorial application. Id. at 1664. The presumption is
rebutted when such statutes show a clear indication of extraterritoriality. Id. at 1665.
36. Id. at 1669.
37. Id. at 1664.
38. Id. at 1665.
39. Id.
40. The Second Circuit originally dismissed the case after finding that
corporate liability does not exist under the ATS because there is no corporate
liability under customary international law. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co.,
621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010).
41. Kiobe4 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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transportation, and compensation, and by allowing the Nigerian
military to use their property to stage attacks." The plaintiffs then
moved to the United States and filed suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York, alleging jurisdiction under the
ATS and requesting relief"t under customary international law." The
district court dismissed some of the claims, but would not dismiss the
claims of crimes against humanity, torture and cruel treatment, and
arbitrary arrest and detention.4
The Second Circuit heard these remaining claims but dismissed the
whole complaint on the grounds that the law of nations does not
recognize corporate liability." Although the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider that question, it later directed the parties to address
the additional question of "[w]hether and under what circumstances the
[ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for violations of the law
of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the
United States."" The Court only resolved this additional question of
when the ATS may apply to actions carried out abroad.
1. Why and how the Supreme Court narrowed the ATS through Kiobel
The Court addressed the difficulty of applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality-which generally applies to statutes
regulating conduct-to a jurisdictional statute, but justified its
application by reasoning that the principles underlying the
presumption also underlie the ATS. The presumption is applied to
determine whether U.S. statutes that regulate conduct (also referred
44. Id. at 1662-63.
45. Id. at 1663.
46. Customary international law is also referred to as the law of nations or
international law. The law of nations is similar to common law in that it is
determined from the customs and practices of civilized nations, which can make it
difficult to determine exactly what actions violate the law of nations. See Mark
Nixdorf, Note, Substance over Form: Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 78
BROOK. L. REv. 1553, 1556-57 (2013). Violations of international law include
genocide, slavery, murder, torture or other inhuman punishment, prolonged
arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 702 (1987). While there are enumerated violations, the
list is not exclusive because some rights may achieve customary international law
status in the future. Id. § 702 cmt. a; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
760 (2004) (stating that courts may recognize new international norms if the norms
are universally accepted and specifically defined).
47. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
48. Id.
49. Id.
2015] 201
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
to as substantive laws) apply abroad, and its purpose is to protect
against disputes between U.S. laws and laws of other countries that
could result in foreign policy implications." Therefore, to avoid
foreign policy consequences unintended by the political branches, the
presumption helps courts determine whether Congress expressly
intended a statute to apply abroad.5 ' Even though the ATS does not
directly regulate conduct, the Court determined that these cautionary
principles underlying the presumption apply to the ATS and serve to
caution courts considering causes of action brought uhder the ATS in
order to avoid "the possibilit[y] of international discord.""
The Court next addressed the possibility of rebutting the
presumption against extraterritoriality. The logical interpretation of
the ATS in litigation, according to the majority, is that for the
plaintiffs to succeed in suing a foreign corporation for alleged
violations that occurred abroad, the ATS itself would need to rebut
the presumption against extraterritoriality with a showing of clear
indication of extraterritoriality." For three reasons, the majority
concluded that the ATS does not rebut the presumption." The first
reason is the text of the statute: nothing in the text shows that
Congress intended for causes of action arising under the ATS to have
an extraterritorial reach."
50. Id. at 1664.
51. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147
(1957)) (stating that courts should be cautious in terms of foreign policy
consequences and impingement on executive and legislative branches' management
of foreign affairs). The caution expressed in Sosa and reiterated in Kiobel, regarding
holding foreign corporations liable for violations committed overseas, was directed at
avoiding unintended foreign policy consequences and avoiding impinging on the
discretion of the executive and legislative branches in managing foreign affairs.
However, this caution was expressed in a case where the facts exhibited almost no
ties to the United States, other than that the plaintiffs lived in America.
53. Id. at 1665.
54. Id. The ATS was passed in response to two instances involving foreign
ambassadors on U.S. soil; once passed, it was only applied to conduct that happened
in the United States. Id. at 1666-67. However, in his 1795 opinion, Attorney
General William Bradford, concerning Americans who joined a French fleet to
invade Sierra Leone, implied, and the Solicitor General interpreted the opinion to
say, that ATS suits could be brought against U.S. citizens for conduct that occurred
in a foreign country. Id. at 1667-68. The Kiobel Court dismissed this by giving the
principles underlying the presumption more weight than the Attorney General's
opinion. Id. at 1668.
55. Id. at 1665 (reasoning that the statute primarily covers violations of the law of
nations; but, because such violations can occur within and outside of the United
States, there is no implication of extraterritoriality; and secondarily, the phrase "any
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The second reason is the historical background of the ATS.56 At
the time of enactment, Congress intended the ATS to cover three
violations of international law: violation of safe conducts,
infringement of ambassadors' rights, and piracy.57  The majority
understood the first two violations not to have extraterritorial
application because they apply to certain peoples' rights when they are
in the United States. While piracy generally occurs on the high seas,
which are treated as foreign soil, " [a]pplying U.S. law to pirates ... does
not typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct
occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign, [so
it] ... carries less direct foreign policy consequences." 9
The third reason is that the ATS was not passed to make the United
States a forum for the enforcement of international norms.'
According to the Court, Congress could not have intended such a
purpose because it would provide for the undesirable result of
allowing other nations to prosecute U.S. citizens for violations of the
law of nations occurring in any country.'
While Kiobel significantly changed litigation under the ATS, the
majority opinion was vague and left open many questions that could
arise in future ATS cases. The last paragraph of the majority opinion
briefly mentions a new "touch and concern" test, which might
"displace" the presumption.6 ' The Court stated that where claims
touch and concern the United States, they must do so with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application. The only explanation provided for this test is that
because corporations are often present in many countries, "mere
corporate presence" is not enough to satisfy the "touch and concern"
civil action" does not necessarily suggest application to torts committed abroad
because terms like "any" do not rebut the presumption).
56. But see Bird et al., supra note 25, at 604-05 (stating that an absence of
legislative history about the ATS and the lack of precedent since its enactment
frustrated contemporary judicial interpretation of the statute until Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), which concluded that the statute was jurisdictional but
allowed judicial recognition of a new, limited class of international norms that could
be litigated under the ATS).
57. Kiobe 133 S. Ct. at 1666.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1667.
60. Id. at 1668. Out of embarrassment that no mechanism existed through which
relief could be provided to foreign officials injured in the United States, Congress
passed the ATS to ensure that the United States could adjudicate such incidents. Id.
61. Id. at 1669.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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test.' Overall, by applying the presumption against extraterritoriality
to the ATS without considering the separate question of corporate
liability, the Supreme Court narrowed the ATS's applicability by
effectively holding that it no longer applies to foreign corporations
that commit violations of international norms overseas.
2. Breyer's concurrence rejected the use of the presumption against
extraterritoriality to determine A TSjurisdiction
Justice Breyer, along with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, concurred with the judgment, but disagreed with the
majority's reasoning. They would find jurisdiction under the ATS in
three situations: (1) where the alleged tort occurred on U.S. soil; (2)
where the defendant is a U.S. national; or (3) where the defendant's
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American
national interest, which includes a distinct interest in preventing the
United States from becoming a safe harbor, free of civil and criminal
liability, for a torturer or other enemy.65
Instead of applying the presumption against extraterritoriality,
these concurring Justices would limit the jurisdictional scope of the
ATS to "where distinct American interests are at issue," which would
minimize foreign policy consequences.' American interests include
not becoming a safe harbor because under international law, all
nations have the duty not to provide safe harbors for their own
nationals who commit serious crimes abroad.6 ' Additionally, Justice
Breyer argued that because other countries allow foreign plaintiffs to
bring suits against their own nationals for unlawful actions abroad,
the United States should allow the same.' Finally, Breyer disagreed
that pirates do not fall under the scope of the ATS and posited that
64. Id. Justice Kennedy's one-paragraph concurrence is equally vague, stating
simply that the opinion leaves open several "significant questions regarding the
reach and interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute." Id. Justice Kennedy further
mused that, in the future, violations of international law might be alleged which will
require "further elaboration and explanation" of the correct use of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. Id.
65. Id. at 1671.
66. Id. at 1674.
67. Id. at 1674-75 (further stating that international norms have included a duty
not to allow a nation to become a safe harbor for pirates or their equivalents, the
United States has a strong interest in not becoming a safe harbor for violators of
international norms, and nothing in the ATS or its history suggests that U.S. courts
should ignore the victims of violations of international law).
68. Id. at 1675.
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modern-day pirates are those who commit torture, genocide, and
other violations of international law.'
By applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS,
the Supreme Court seemed to limit the ATS's applicability regarding
violations of international norms committed abroad, unless the
plaintiffs could successfully rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Because of the majority's lack of explanation of
the new "touch and concern" test and Justice Breyer's concurring
opinion arguing the presumption was wrongly applied, confusion
resulted in the lower courts about whether Kiobel actually limited the
ATS's applicability. Additionally, discussion of the original issue of
corporate liability under the ATS was seemingly abandoned.
C. Kiobel Caused a Circuit Split Regarding U.S. Corporate Liability for
Extraterritorial Conduct
In the wake of Kiobel, the Supreme Court's vague opinion forced
lower courts to interpret unclear comments regarding corporate
liability under the ATS. Specifically, courts are split regarding
whether U.S. corporations may be held liable under the ATS for
alleged violations of international law carried out abroad.
A successful ATS claim against a U.S. corporation includes two
elements: first, corporate liability itself, meaning whether the
corporation may actually be held liable under the ATS; and second,
whether the alleged conduct sufficiently touches and concerns the
United States to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.
The majority of courts focus on how closely connected the alleged
conduct is to the United States, using the presumption against
extraterritoriality to determine whether the defendant-corporation
may be held liable."o In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's recently decided
case, Nestle, focused specifically on how to determine corporate liability.
The questions of corporate liability and the presumption against
extraterritoriality overlap in many cases, but they are distinct analyses.
While most courts focus on the location of conduct to determine
69. Id. Justice Breyer further analogized that a pirate's ship from a particular
nation was within that nation's jurisdiction; therefore piracy is not unlike misconduct
on land. Id. at 1672.
70. See Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir.
2014) (taking into account whether any alleged conduct touched and concerned the
United States with enough force to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality);
Balintulo v. Daimler A.G., 727 F.3d 174, 189 (2d Cir. 2013) (interpreting the holding
of Kiobel to automatically prohibit ATS jurisdiction when the alleged conduct of a
corporation occurs outside the United States).
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corporate liability using the touch and concern test, this Comment, in
agreement with the Ninth Circuit, focuses on corporate liability as a
separate question from the presumption of extraterritoriality.
1. The Second and Eleventh Circuits interpret Kiobel to mean that U.S.
corporations may not be held liable under the ATS for extraterritorial violations
The Second and Eleventh Circuits ruled that U.S. corporations may
not be held liable for actions abroad." Both circuits understood
from Kiobel that the location of the conduct is the main issue in ATS
cases rather than the citizenship of the corporation being sued."
The Second Circuit interpreted Kiobel to mean that, under the
ATS, plaintiffs cannot sue multinational corporations in the United
States for actions occurring overseas, regardless of the corporations'
citizenship or whether American interests are involved." Despite an
extreme allegation of helping to uphold the South African
government's apartheid regime, the court held that under Kiobel,
American interests are irrelevant because the rule for corporate
liability only considers where the alleged violations took place."
The court reiterated two reasons, originally explained by the
Supreme Court, for its caution in granting ATS jurisdiction.
Primarily, the court cautioned against infringing on the legislative
and executive branches' management of foreign affairs by hearing
cases that involve foreign countries because of the risk of causing
foreign policy consequences. 75 The court additionally cautioned that
the ATS can force judges to create federal common law, causing
potentially dangerous judicial interference in foreign policy.76
Similarly, in Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc.,n the
Eleventh Circuit held that U.S. federal courts have no jurisdiction to
71. Chiquita, 760 F.3d at 1189; Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 193.
72. But see In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to allege conduct that sufficiently
touched and concerned the United States, thus opening the door for corporate
liability under the ATS, albeit through the use of the presumption against
extraterritoriality, rather than immediate dismissal of such cases).
73. Batintulo, 727 F.3d at 193. In Batintuto, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant's subsidiaries aided and abetted the South African government in carrying
out apartheid by selling cars and computers to government officials. Id. at 182-83.
74. Id. at 190, 192 (holding further that Supreme Court precedent cannot be re-
interpreted in light of irrelevant factual distinctions such as a defendant's citizenship
because the Court's analysis focused solely on the location of the conduct).
75. Id. at 187.
76. Id.
77. 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014).
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hear cases regarding torts committed abroad.7 ' The Eleventh Circuit
focused on the "touch and concern" test briefly mentioned in the
Kiobel opinion;79 although the Supreme Court did not specifically
define this test, the Eleventh Circuit understood it to mean that U.S.
corporate citizenship does not sufficiently touch and concern the
United States if the relevant actions took place outside of the United
States.so The court ruled that the ATS does not apply to
extraterritorial torts and that all relevant conduct took place outside
the United States; therefore, the alleged torts did not touch or
concern U.S. territory.8 ' The difference from Kiobel--the
corporations' U.S. citizenship-did not, according to the Eleventh
Circuit, change the Supreme Court's interpretation of Congress's
intent regarding the extraterritoriality of the ATS; if Congress
intended otherwise, a more specific statute would be in place clearly
indicating its application outside of the United States."
2. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits interpret Kiobel to mean that U.S.
corporations may be held liable under the A TS for extraterritorial violations
In the wake of Kiobel, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits agreed that
corporations may be held liable under the ATS, but took different
approaches to reach this conclusion. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit focused on the presumption against
extraterritoriality by expanding on the Supreme Court's "touch and
concern" test briefly mentioned at the end of Kiobel." In Al Shimari v.
CACI Premier Technology, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit held that the
plaintiffs' claims touched and concerned the territory of the United
States with sufficient force to rebut the presumption against
78. Id. at 1189. Four thousand Colombian citizens sued Chiquita Brands
International, Inc. and Chiquita Fresh North LLC for participating in a campaign of
torture and murder in Colombia. Id. at 1188. Chiquita allegedly reviewed, approved,
and concealed payments and weapons shipments to Colombian paramilitary
organizations, allegedly violating the ATS. Id. at 1192 (Martin,J., dissenting).
79. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
80. Chiquita, 760 F.3d at 1189 (emphasizing that the mere fact that a defendant is
a U.S. corporation as opposed to a corporation who is present in the United States
does not confer ATS jurisdiction because the difference does not indicate
Congressional intent for the ATS to apply extraterritorially). The court explained
that a more specific statute would be required if Congress intended otherwise, but
"[t]here is no other statute" so "[t] here is no jurisdiction." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529 (4th Cir. 2014).
84. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014).
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extraterritoriality.15  The plaintiffs, Iraqi citizens, sued a military
contractor, alleging abuse and torture at the hands of U.S. military
personnel in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq." American citizens, under a
contract between an American corporation and the U.S. government,
carried out the violations at a military facility operated by the U.S.
government, and the corporation facilitated these activities because
managers knew about the misconduct and tried to cover it up while
also encouraging it." The court reconciled the presumption and the
"touch and concern" language to mean that the presumption bars
jurisdiction unless a fact-based analysis shows a close connection to
U.S. territory sufficient to displace the presumption."
While the Fourth Circuit focused on expanding the "touch and
concern" test and the presumption against extraterritoriality, the
Ninth Circuit adopted a norm-by-norm analysis to determine
corporate liability, treating corporate liability as a separate analysis
and not focusing on the presumption at all." Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A.,
Inc.9o is the most recent case law regarding U.S. corporate liability
under the ATS, and the case specifically sets out steps to determine
whether corporate liability may be achieved on a case-by-case basis."
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit broke down its
corporate liability analysis into two parts: first, under what
85. Id. at 520.
86. Id. at 521-22.
87. Here, the claims sufficiently touched and concerned the United States
because of several factors: the plaintiffs alleged that U.S. citizens committed torture;
CACI was incorporated in the state of Virginia; the torture allegedly occurred at a
facility operated by U.S. government personnel; a government office in the state of
Arizona issued CACI's military contract between CACI and the U.S. Department of
the Interior; CACI collected payments by sending invoices to Colorado; the U.S.
Department of Defense required CACI interrogators to obtain security clearances;
and CACI managers in the United States allegedly knew of reports of misconduct
abroad, tried to cover up these incidents, and encouraged such misconduct. Id. at
528-29. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, rejected the Second Circuit's "touch and
concern" test "by considering a broader range of facts than the location where the
plaintiffs" were injured. Id. at 529.
88. Al Shimai, 758 F.3d at 528 ("[I]t is not sufficient merely to say that because
the actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch and concern United
States territory."). The court also pointed out that the principle underlying the
presumption-avoiding discord between U.S. laws and laws of other nations-did
not exist in this case; because the ATS is jurisdictional, not a statute outlining
conduct, international norms enforced under it are recognized as actionable by
other nations so there is no potential for discord. Id. at 529-30.
89. Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021, 1027-28 (9th Cir. 2014).
90. 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
91. Id. at 1021-22.
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circumstances corporations can be liable for ATS claims; and second,
whether recovery is permissible using the touch and concern test."
The Ninth Circuit adopted a norm-by-norm analysis of corporate
liability, which analyzes each norm alleged to determine its nature
and scope, and ultimately determines whether the corporation can
be sued in federal court for that claim." The court adopted this
approach instead of a per se rule of either corporate liability or
corporate immunity under the ATS; as a result, the court implicitly
emphasized that corporate liability and the presumption against
extraterritoriality are different but related concepts, each presenting
an obstacle to finding ATS liability.
In Nestle, former child slaves forced to harvest cocoa in the Ivory
Coast brought action against multinational companies that essentially
controlled Ivorian cocoa production." The plaintiffs alleged that the
companies were liable under the ATS for aiding and abetting child
slavery in the Ivory Coast." The district court dismissed the case for
failure to state a claim" after concluding that corporations cannot be
sued under the ATS." On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that there
is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or liability under the
ATS and that the universal norm of international law of the
prohibition against slavery supported the plaintiffs' ATS claim." The
court explained that corporate liability does not depend on
international precedent enforcing legal norms against corporations;9"
rather, it is determined by a case-by-case analysis.'"m
The Ninth Circuit took particular note of what gave rise to the
allegations. The defendants dominated the international cocoa
industry, which primarily depends on farms in the Ivory Coast.'0 '
92. Id. at 1022. The court only addressed the first question because it permitted
plaintiffs to amend their complaint in light of Kiobe4 allowing them to allege conduct
that touches and concerns the United States. Id. at 1029 (Rawlinson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
93. Id. at 1021.
94. Id. at 1017.
95. Id. at 1016.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1018.
98. Id. at 1022.
99. Id. at 1021. However, universal and absolute norms can still be considered a
precedential basis for ATS claims against corporations. Id.
100. Id. at 1022 (ruling that the determination of when a corporation can be held
liable under the ATS involves two steps: (1) apply customary international law to
determine the nature and scope of the norm underlying the plaintiffs claim, and (2) apply
domestic tort law to determine whether recovery from the corporation is permissible).
101. Id. at 1017.
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While the defendants themselves did not own the farms, they had
exclusive buy-sell relationships with the farmers and imported most of
the Ivory Coast's cocoa.o 2 Further, the defendants provided financial
and technical support to the farms and visited them several times per
year.'0 3 These financial and technical provisions were used to enforce
child slavery on the cocoa farms; the children were underfed,
whipped and beaten, and forced to work fourteen hours a day for six
days a week.' 1 Guards tortured children that tried to escape, using
methods such as cutting their feet and forcing them to drink urine.'0 o
The plaintiffs' case focused on the facts of the alleged violation.
They set forth facts to prove that the defendants knew about the child
slavery;'06 continued to supply money, equipment, labor, and training,
despite knowing it would be used to compel forced child labor; and
successfully lobbied against congressional efforts to stop child labor,
ensuring the adoption of a voluntary enforcement system of choosing
whether to certify products as slave-free, instead of Congress's original
proposal of such a system being required However, the defendants
argued that the plaintiffs' case was an improper extraterritorial
application of federal law contrary to Kiobel based on their further
argument that there was no specific, universal, and obligatory norm
preventing corporations from aiding and abetting slave labor.'0o
The court based its reasoning on precedent regarding ATS liability
generally and on precedent regarding corporate liability. First, the
court explained its interpretation of ATS liability, relying on Filartiga
and Sosa. Filartiga indicated that the ATS is designed to open federal
courts for cases regarding rights recognized by international law.'
102. Id.
103. Id. (stating that the financial assistance consisted of advanced payment for
cocoa and spending-money for the farmers' personal use, and the technical support
consisted of equipment and training in growing and fermentation techniques, farm
maintenance, and labor practices).
104. Id.at1017.
105. Id.
106. The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants had such knowledge because of
various reports and through their visits to the farms. Id.
107. Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the defendants' Congressional lobbying "in
effect, guarantee[d] the continued use of the cheapest labor available to produce
[cocoa]-that of child slaves." Id. at 1017-18.
108. Id. at 1020.
109. Id. at 1018.
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Similarly, the Supreme Court in Sosa stated that federal courts can hear
tort claims based on a limited set of violations of international law.' 10
Second, the court developed its corporate liability analysis by
reaffirming its ruling in Sarei and the distinction between the
functions of international and domestic laws. Because the main
focus of international law is the conduct of states, the Ninth Circuit
focused on whether the asserted norm is applicable to both state
and private actors."' The Ninth Circuit answered this issue using its
norm-by-norm analysis from Sarei.
In Sarei, the Ninth Circuit required a norm-by-norm analysis to
determine whether international law extends a norm against a
specific act to the actor in question. Specifically, for each individual
ATS claim, courts should look to international law to determine
whether corporations are subject to the norms underlying that claim
by performing a norm-by-norm analysis of corporate liability."'
The universality of the norm in question determines whether
corporations may be held liable for violating that norm" 1: the
international norm allegedly violated must be definite and universally
accepted,"" and universal norms are applicable to corporations as
well as individuals."' The Sarei court reasoned that it would be
inconsistent with the universality of such norms to allow entities to
avoid liability by incorporating in a certain country."` The Ninth
110. Id. (stating that the Court in Sosa reasoned that federal common law creates
tort liability for violations of international legal norms, and the ATS gives federal
courts jurisdiction to hear these claims; therefore, ATS claims can invoke rights
created by the law of nations).
111. Id. at 1020-21 (stating that if the defendant is a private actor, such as a
corporation or individual, courts should consider "whether international law extends
the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued"
(citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004))).
112. Id. at 1021. Sarei held that universal norms, which are applicable to all actors
including states, individuals, and groups, provide the basis for ATS claims against
corporations. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, P.L.C., 671 F.3d 736, 748 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on
other grounds, 133 S. CL 1995 (2013). To determine whether norms are universal, courts
should consider whether the norm is limited to states and whether its application
depends on the identity of the perpetrator. Id. at 760. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
universal norms are also applicable to corporations, and when the applicability of such
norms depends on the identity of the victims (in other words, the court considers
whether the norm protects the victims without regard to who or what entity commits the
violation), corporations may be held liable. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1021.
113. See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760.
114. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1665 (2013); Sosa, 542
U.S. at 732.
115. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1021.
116. Id. (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760).
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Circuit further reasoned that to determine whether norms are
universal, courts should consider whether the scope of the norms is
limited to states-international norms that are universal, or applicable
to private individuals or groups as well as to states and state actors, are
also applicable to corporations."' For example, the International Court
ofJustice determined that the international norm against genocide may
be violated by a state, an amorphous group, or a private individual;
because of the norm's universality, the Ninth Circuit extended the
applicability to corporations."' While the Ninth Circuit in Sareijustified
holding corporations liable by using examples of precedent applying
international norms to corporations, it specifically stated that the
absence of international decisions or precedent enforcing legal norms
against corporations does not mean corporate liability for violations of
international norms is impossible under the ATS."'
The Ninth Circuit in Nestle concluded its corporate liability analysis by
establishing the distinction between the roles of international and
domestic law.' 2 0 International law controls whether international legal
norms provide bases for ATS claims against corporations, whereas
domestic law governs questions about civil liability and litigation."'
The Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm analysis uses the universality of
norms and case-specific facts to determine corporate liability before
considering the presumption against extraterritoriality. Although the
Fourth Circuit found corporate liability under the ATS, so far the
Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court to separate the presumption
against extraterritoriality and corporate liability analysis.
a. Lower courts are moving towards separating the corporate liability
and presumption against extraterritoriality analyses
Despite recent lower courts' primary focus on the presumption
against extraterritoriality analysis, Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp."' implies
a trend towards accepting corporate liability. In Exxon Mobi4 the court
117. Id. (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760, 765).
118. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760. The prohibition against slavery, at issue in Nestle, is a
universal norm and can be applied to corporations. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1022
(recognizing the fact that private, non-state actors were held liable at Nuremburg for
slavery, that certain statutes of International Criminal Tribunals use the language
"persons responsible," and that it would be against the absolute and universal
prohibition on slavery and the underlying moral imperative that justifies the
prohibition to allow entities to escape liability by incorporating).
119. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1022 (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760-61).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 69 F. Supp. 3d 75 (D.D.C. 2014).
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implied that corporate liability and the "touch and concern" test are two
different tests that must be applied when determining corporate liability
under the ATS.' 23 Most importantly, when discussing whether liability
existed for this particular case, the court did not mention the issue of
corporate liability under the ATS.12 ' The court merely stated that
liability for aiding and abetting is available under the ATS because it is
established in the law of nations, implying that corporate liability was not
a separate bar to ATS liability in this particular case.125
While lower courts are not producing uniform decisions, some are
beginning to find U.S. corporations liable under the ATS for conduct
that occurs abroad. Whether the alleged actions are sufficient to
allow plaintiffs to succeed is still of much debate; however, this trend
is significant because it sheds light on the future of ATS litigation.
While to some, "mere corporate presence" might be too analogous to
U.S. corporate citizenship to displace the presumption,"' to others,
including federal courts, U.S. residency in addition to a violation of a
universally applicable international norm supports the notion that
U.S. corporations themselves can be sued under the ATS in federal
courts.'12  Therefore, contrary to some scholarly opinion, the use of
123. Id. at 96 (alleging that management decisions related to Exxon's activities in
Indonesia were made in the United States, officials in the United States implemented
decisions to hire more security for Exxon's facilities in Indonesia, and that Exxon
provided support to their military personnel; but the plaintiffs did not state where Exxon
planned or authorized the support, or if any support came from the United States).
124. See id. at 93-94.
125. See id. While Ninth Circuit decisions are not controlling in the District of
Columbia, applying the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm analysis would strengthen the
District Court's conclusion that U.S. corporate liability was available under the ATS
by establishing the reasoning behind such liability. But see In re S. Afr. Apartheid
Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 338-39 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (holding that no relevant
corporate conduct touched or concerned the United States, dismissing the claim for
lack of jurisdiction under the ATS because of Balintulo's binding precedent), affd,
Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 171 (2d Cir. 2015) (failing to decide whether
"customary international law recognizes the asserted liability of the Companies").
126. Donald Childress, Kiobel Commentary: An ATS Answer with Many Questions (and the
Possibility of a Brave New World of Transnational Litigation), SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013,
5:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/kiobel-commentary-an-ats-answer-with-
many-questions-and-the-possibilityof-a-brave-new-world-of-transnational-litigation.
127. See Exxon Mobil, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 97 (allowing the plaintiffs to amend their
complaint following Kiobel to allege conduct sufficiently touching and concerning
the United States); In re S. Af, 56 F. Supp. 3d at 339 (same); Joel Slawotsky, Corporate
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute: The Latest Twist, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Apr.
26, 2014), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2014/04/joel-slawotsky-on-corporate-
liability.html (mentioning the possibility that U.S. residency precludes U.S.
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the ATS to litigate overseas human rights violations is still relevant,
and other avenues of litigation need not be explored.12 1
Despite the ATS's jurisdictional nature, the Supreme Court applied
the generally conduct-related presumption of extraterritoriality to the
jurisdictional statute, which served to limit the pre-Kiobel functions of
the ATS and caused a circuit split. The Supreme Court's limitations
emphasized caution to lower courts deciding ATS jurisdiction in light
of concerns regarding unwanted foreign policy consequences and
intruding on the political branches' power over foreign policy
decisions. Therefore, because these concerns-the very principles
underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality-apply to the
ATS, the Court ruled that the presumption applies to the ATS.'12
Since Kiobel created confusion among lower courts, only two circuits,
the Fourth and Ninth, allow for U.S. corporate liability. The Ninth
Circuit's approach of separating the analysis of corporate liability
from the presumption against extraterritoriality should be adopted
because a corporation's liability should not depend on, and is not
related to, the location of its actions.
II. ANALYSIS
This Part argues that the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm analysis
used in Nestle is the best approach to determine whether U.S.
corporations may be held liable for alleged violations of international
norms occurring outside the United States. The Ninth Circuit's
universality test130 ensures that domestic corporations are held
accountable for their actions abroad."' A blanket rule against
corporate liability, as adopted in the Second and Eleventh Circuits,
confines the applicability of the ATS to very narrow circumstances
and allows U.S. corporations to freely violate international law
corporations from using the presumption as a defense). Whether the actual conduct
alleged sufficiently displaces the presumption is not addressed in this Comment.
128. See Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89
NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1749, 1754 (2014) (arguing that Kiobel severely limited the
usefulness of the ATS because the presumption against extraterritoriality essentially
precludes most litigation under the statute).
129. See supra Part I.B.1 (explaining in detail the Supreme Court's justification for
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS).
130. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, P.L.C., 671 F.3d 736, 760, 765 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on other
ground 133 S. CL 1995 (2013) (declaring the universality test, which states that
international norms that are universal, or applicable to private individuals and/or groups as
well as to states and state actors, are also applicable to corporations).
131. Infra Part II.A.1.
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overseas.1 2 Such limited use of the ATS severely reduces the statute's
effectiveness-Congress would not have passed the ATS if it intended
the chances of use to be negligible.'m Additionally, the norm-by-
norm analysis complies with the jurisdictional purpose of the ATS.
Unlike the presumption against extraterritoriality, which determines
the existence of jurisdiction by looking at whether a statute regulates
conduct abroad, 3 1 the norm-by-norm approach determines whether
the norm is internationally definite and accepted under Sosa and, if
so, whether it is universally applicable to state and non-state actors
(including corporations). 3 ' By adjudicating U.S. corporations' overseas
misconduct, federal courts will not impinge on any foreign policy issues
or interfere with another nation's laws-one of the reasons for passing
the ATS; when a U.S. corporation violates international norms, federal
courts should have jurisdiction because domestic U.S. interests are
strongly implicated and international norms are universally accepted. 3 6
Further, the ATS should remain the primary method of adjudicating
alien torts to ensure equal treatment of foreign corporations with a
presence in the United States and U.S. corporations. 3 1
From a policy standpoint, this Part argues that U.S. corporations
that know of or encourage violations of international norms must be
held accountable in federal courts under the ATS. Under Kiobel, U.S.
corporations would escape liability under the ATS for violating
international norms by virtue of being corporations. 138 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that such circumvention of liability is contrary to the
universality of international norms that are recognized as federal
132. Infra Part II.B.1.
133. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013) ("Congress
did not intend the [ATS] to be stillborn." (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 714 (2004))); id. at 1669 (Kennedy,J., concurring) ("Other cases may arise with
allegations of serious violations of international law principles protecting persons,
cases covered neither by the [Torture Victim Protection Act] nor by the reasoning
and holding of today's case [concerning the ATS]; and in those disputes the proper
implementation of the presumption against extraterritorial application may require
some further elaboration and explanation.").
134. Id. at 1664.
135. Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sare,
671 F.3d at 760, 765).
136. Infra Part II.B.2.
137. Infra Part II.B.3.
138. The majority in Cardona v. Chiquita Brands International, Inc. says this
circumvention of liability is a foreign policy issue rather than a legal issue, and is not
for courts to decide or consider. 760 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2014).
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common law claims under the ATS."' Further, circumvention of
liability by incorporating in the United States would effectively mean
that the Supreme Court's caution against becoming a safe harbor for
those who violate international norms, expressed in Breyer's
concurrence in Kiobel, would be ignored."' Finally, although there
are many convincing arguments that Kiobel pushed ATS litigation to
state courts and state law, this would likely result in little conformity
in the application of various states' laws."' In turn, this would create
larger foreign policy implications than would simply allowing federal
courts to apply one federal law in a uniform, cautious manner.
A. A Norm-by-Norm Analysis Should Be Adopted to Determine U.S.
Corporate Liability under the A TS
Allowing corporations to escape liability for violating international
norms by virtue of where they incorporate is contrary to the
universality of international norms. A norm that is universally
accepted among nations; sufficiently definite and specific; and
universally applicable to states, individuals, and groups, should also
be applicable to all corporations. 142 Kiobel restated that federal courts
may only recognize causes of action under the ATS based on
"definite norms" of international law, reiterating the rule established
139. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, P.L.C., 671 F.3d 736, 760 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on other
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
140. Infra Part II.C..
141. Infra Part II.C.2.
142. See Sare, 671 F.3d at 760, 765. In 2015, the Ninth Circuit denied a rehearing
en banc of Nestle. The accompanying dissent contained two principal critiques of the
majority's reaffirmation of Sarei's corporate liability analysis: first, the majority's
reasoning, that corporations are liable because slavery is categorically prohibited as
an international norm, means that "any norm 'categorical' enough to give rise to an
ATS claim ... necessarily gives rise to corporate liability"; and second, the rule that
precedent holding corporations liable for violations of international norms is not
necessary for a valid claim of corporate liability under the ATS conflicts with Sosa's
warning that federal courts should cautiously recognize violations of international
norms as new causes of action under the ATS. Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 788 F.3d
946, 955 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., dissenting). However, a corporation is not
automatically rendered liable just because a norm is universal and applicable to all
actors; rather, only the possibility for corporate liability exists. Additionally, allowing
recognition of an ATS claim without specific precedent holding a corporation liable
for such a violation does not get rid of the requirement that courts should only
recognize new ATS claims cautiously; it is merely one step in the norm-by-norm
analysis that allows courts to contemplate holding a corporation liable under the
ATS. Further, because there is currently no precedent holding corporations civilly
liable for a violation of an international norm, requiring such precedent would
eliminate corporate liability and prevent courts from progressing the law.
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in Sosa."' Examples of established international norms include
genocide,1" slavery,1 4 5  torture,"' and apartheid.' 7  Allowing
corporations to circumvent liability by virtue of where they
incorporate is unfair because it means that international norms are
universally applicable to every violator except corporations" 8-this
arguably ignores the purpose and concept of universality.
1. The Ninth Circuit's norm-ly-norm analysis ensures corporations are not given
special treatment, as opposed to a per se rule prohibiting corporate liability under the
ATS that the Second and Eleventh Circuits have seemingly adopted
The Ninth Circuit's reaffirmation of its fact-specific corporate
liability analysis in Sarei leads to better, more appropriate, and
consistent results than a bright-line rule. Under the Second and
Eleventh Circuits' reasoning, corporations get special treatment
regarding liability under the ATS when the alleged conduct occurs
outside the United States because the presumption against
extraterritoriality is understood to preclude such corporate
liability entirely. "' However, the facts of Chiquita and Balintulo are
very similar to those of Nestle, and the violations of international
norms alleged are also similar.
The severity of each of the international norms implicated in
Balintulo, Chiquita, and Nestle, as well as the facts of these cases, are
strikingly similar; yet, two different outcomes resulted. First, the
violation of international norms against apartheid, torture and
murder, and child slavery are all equally shocking and impart severe
consequences on victims.5 o Second, the facts of each case are
analogous. In Balintulo, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants'
subsidiaries aided and abetted the South African government's
regime of apartheid by selling cars to the apartheid security forces
and computers to the government, which were used to carry out
143. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013); see Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (stating that international norms
recognized under the ATS must be specific, universal, and obligatory).
144. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760.
145. Doe Iv. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014).
146. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014).
147. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), affd,
Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 171 (2d Cir. 2015).
148. See Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1021-22 (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760).
149. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014);
Balintulo v. Daimler A.G., 727 F.3d 174, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2013).
150. See, e.g., Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1017 (child slavery); Chiquita, 760 F.3d at 1187
(torture and murder); Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 179-80 (apartheid).
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geographic segregation.' 5 ' In Chiquita, the plaintiffs alleged that
Chiquita reviewed, approved, and concealed payments and weapons
shipments to Colombian paramilitary organizations that were then
used to carry out a campaign of torture and murder.'5 2 In Nestle, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants provided financial support,
technical equipment, labor, and training to the Ivorian farmers, all of
which were used to enforce child slavery on cocoa farms effectively
controlled by the defendants.' In each case, plaintiffs alleged that
U.S. corporations knowingly sold goods to foreign nationals, which
were used to carry out violations of international norms. Despite the
similarities, both the Second and Eleventh Circuits dismissed the
cases. The courts in Balintulo and Chiquita determined that there is
no possibility of U.S. corporate liability for extraterritorial conduct
under the ATS."' In contrast, even the Supreme Court in Sosa said
that, other than the three international norms the ATS was created to
cover, courts have the ability to recognize new norms if they are
sufficiently accepted and specifically defined.'
Applying the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm analysis to both cases,
it is clear that these international norms (apartheid, torture, and
murder) apply to U.S. corporations under the ATS, and U.S.
corporations, therefore, are susceptible to liability for violating such
norms.' The Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States lists the prohibitions against both torture and
systematic racial discrimination as international norms.'" Further,
these norms are generally accepted among civilized nations and
courts have applied them to non-state actors.'58  Therefore,
151. Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 182-83.
152. Chiquita, 760 F.3d at 1188.
153. Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1016-17.
154. See Chiquita, 760 F.3d at 1189 (determining that the fact of incorporation in
the United States did not affect ATS liability for extraterritorial torts); Balintulo, 727
F.3d at 192 (asserting that even U.S. corporations cannot be liable for violations of
international law committed abroad because vicarious corporate liability is
unavailable under the ATS).
155. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004); id. at 760 (Kennedy,J.,
concurring).
156. See Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1028 (allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint
based on Kiobel, which permits the inference that Nestle is more likely to be held
liable under the ATS because it is a U.S. corporation).
157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFFOREIGN RELATIONS LAw§ 702 (1987).
158. See Nixdorf, supra note 46, at 1556-57 (detailing the framework of what
constitutes international law, which includes the customs and usages of civilized
nations); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir.
2014) (allowing allegations of torture against U.S. corporations to be heard under
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corporations can be held liable under the ATS for violating the
international norms against apartheid and torture because such norms
are universal, according to Nestle, meaning they are applicable to
corporations. Contrasted with the actual results of Chiquita and
Balintulo, the Ninth Circuit analysis ensures that U.S. corporations are
held responsible for actions they commit and does not allow them to
escape the possibility of liability simply by virtue of being corporations.
Therefore, it is reasonable that a universally accepted international
norm should apply to corporations as well as individuals, groups, and
states.'`9 In this way, the outcome under the Ninth Circuit is fairer to
plaintiffs and to the United States' interests because its norm-by-norm
nature produces consistent but flexible outcomes.
2. Courts should determine whether each norm at issue is applicable to the
defendant-corporation to achieve uniform decisions
Determining whether each norm at issue is applicable to the
defendant-corporation allows for uniform decision-making because
this practice will create precedent and because courts may look to
precedent to determine whether the relevant norms are universal.
Although Sarei specifically stated that "the proper inquiry is not
whether there is a specific precedent,"'" the inverse implication is
that when there is precedent extending prohibition of an
international norm to the perpetrator-defendant, it can be trusted
and followed.'"' Further, when there is a lack of precedent holding
the ATS); In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(allowing allegations of apartheid to be heard under the ATS), aff'd, Balintulo v.
Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 171 (2d Cir. 2015).
159. See generally Doug Cassel, Suing Americans for Human Rights Torts Overseas: The
Supreme Court Leaves the Door Open, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1773 (2014) (arguing in
favor of ATS jurisdiction over individual American nationals for overseas human
rights torts, such as corporate executives); Alison Bensimon, Note, Corporate Liability
Under the Alien Tort Statute: Can Corporations Have Their Cake and Eat It Too?, 10 Loy.
U. CHI. INT'L L. REv. 199 (2013) (asserting that U.S. federal courts should be able to
find corporations liable under the ATS for violating international law abroad);
Nixdorf, supra note 46 (contending that claims of U.S. corporate liability are
available under the ATS because the substance of the abuse is more important than
the form of the perpetrator).
160. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, P.L.C., 671 F.3d 736, 760 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on other
grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013).
161. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2014) (stating that a
relevant consideration is "whether international law extends the scope of liability for
a violation of a given norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a. . .
corporation"). The Court in Sosa found that there was no private cause of action
(against an individual) in part because there was no precedent to hold an individual
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corporations liable for certain norms, analyzing each norm allows
courts to draw inferences in order to establish either new
international norms or newly-applicable norms to corporations; 162
this provides a degree of flexibility that a bright-line rule would not.
As an example of making such an inference, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that liability for violations of international norms does not
depend on the identity-individual, group, or corporation-of the
perpetrator, but rather on the identity of the victims, analogizing war
crimes from the Geneva Conventions with universal and definite
international norms." The Geneva Conventions protect the victims of
war crimes and do not differentiate between public and private actors;
instead, they focus on what protections are given to the victims.16 1
Civilized nations universally accept war crimes as violations of
international norms.16 5 Therefore, because international norms against
war crimes are universally applicable to whomever commits them,
regardless of whether it is a private or public entity,' 6 other universal and
definite international norms are applicable to whomever violates them. 161
A lack of U.S. precedent holding corporations liable under the
ATS should not preclude that possibility in the future. When
Congress enacted the ATS, its focus was on three international
norms, but it could not have imagined the degree to which
international liability would grow." The same idea, of not requiring
precedent in order to find corporations liable under the ATS, was
extended to international tribunals in Sarei: just because an
international tribunal has not held a corporation criminally liable
under international law does not mean it could not or would not do
so in the future.'" The flexibility of allowing corporations to be held
liable under the ATS for an illegal detention of less than one day that was followed
by a transfer of custody to lawful authorities and arraignment within an acceptable
period of time. Id. at 738.
162. See Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760-61 ("We, however, believe the proper inquiry is not
whether there is a specific precedent [of international institutions holding
corporations liable for war crimes], but whether international law extends its
prohibitions to the perpetrators in question.").
163. Id. at 765. Sarei held a non-U.S. corporation liable, which further supports
the proposition that U.S. corporations can be held liable under the ATS.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014).
168. Sarei, 671 F.3d at 761.
169. Id. However, the court did point to one example of a German corporation
that was held civilly liable under customary international law for helping build and
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liable for violations of international norms with or without precedent
allows for the real possibility of holding corporations liable for such
violations and should be adopted in the corporate liability analysis.
B. Jurisdiction for Corporate Liability Should Arise Under the ATS
1. A per se rule of corporate immunity would result in a non-uniform
application of the law and would potentially interfere with foreign policy
A per se rule of corporate immunity under the ATS for actions that
occur overseas might force alleged violations of the law of nations to
be raised in state courts, under state law, or in federal courts using
foreign diversity jurisdiction. This would result in different
applications of the different laws, and might cause unintended foreign
policy consequences. Precedent, legislative history, and an analysis of
choice of law arguments are illustrative of such an outcome.
Currently, under federal law and based on precedent from various
circuit courts, the results of corporate liability cases under the ATS
are not uniform. This is not to suggest that a shift to state court
litigation should occur, but that adoption of the Ninth Circuit's two-
part test, the norm-by-norm analysis followed by determining whether
recovery is permissible, would solve this uniformity issue most
effectively. Four circuit courts have come to two opposite results
using the same Kiobel rationale, and lower courts are also at odds.' 70
Whereas the Second and Eleventh Circuits have held that there can
be no corporate liability under the ATS,' 7 1 the Fourth and Ninth
Circuits have held that U.S. corporations can be held liable under the
ATS.17 ' This means that the plaintiffs currently amending their
complaints (which courts are allowing because of Kiobel) cannot be
certain of their chances of succeeding because of the different, vague
tests used by the different circuit courts. For example, in In re South
African Apartheid Litigation, the judge originally held, before Kiobel,
that corporate liability was not possible under the ATS, and then held
maintain the German war potential during World War II. Id. The corporation was
dissolved and its assets were disposed of. Id.
170. See supra Part L.C (detailing the difference between the Second and Eleventh
Circuits' views-which reject corporate liability for extraterritorial conduct under the
ATS-and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits'-which advocate such liability-and
pointing out similar reasoning in lower court cases).
171. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014);
Balintulo v. Daimler A.G., 727 F.3d 174, 188 (2d Cir. 2013).
172. Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014); Al Shimari v.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014).
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the opposite after Kiobel and let plaintiffs amend their complaint.17 3
However, the same or similar plaintiff might experience a different
outcome by bringing a case under the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction,
where the controlling law is now Nestle.
The legislative history of the ATS indicates that the statute was
meant to prevent unintended foreign policy consequences and to
provide uniformity through cautious adjudication using federal
law." First, Congress passed the ATS to prevent unintended foreign
policy consequences, so violations of international norms committed
abroad arising under any statute other than the ATS would directly
contravene Congressional intent." The foreign policy concerns
underlying the ATS are the reasons for its limited reach in
recognizing only international norms that are specific, universal, and
obligatory."' Second, the idea that federal courts must exercise such
a high degree of caution when deciding ATS cases makes it less
desirable that state courts should hear such cases because they might
not have the sophistication or familiarity with federal law to exercise
the same amount of caution. Further, if state tort law was used as an
alternative to federal law, the outcome of such suits would differ from
state to state, causing confusion and non-uniformity in the types of cases
that the Supreme Court emphasized require cautious decision-making.
Additionally, Congress has not limited the ATS's substantive or
jurisdictional reach, but did enact other separate statutes, which allow
the United States to prosecute and victims to obtain damages from
foreign persons who commit violations of serious crimes (such as torture
and genocide) against foreign victims abroad."' This is telling of at least
some legislative intent to allow corporate liability under the ATS.
173. See, e.g, In re S. Mr. Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 332-33 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality barred jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs' ATS claims), affd, Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 171
(2d Cir. 2015). Ultimately, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' case because the
complaint did not allege conduct that sufficiently touched and concerned the
United States under Balintulo. Id. at 338-39.
174. See supra Part I.B.1 (detailing the legislative history of the ATS and the
original reasons for which it was passed).
175. See supra Part I.B.1 (detailing the reasons a statute was needed to help the
United States avoid unintended foreign policy consequences).
176. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664-65 (2013) (noting
specifically the dangers of courts impinging on the political branches' powers over
foreign affairs and the possible foreign policy consequences of making violations of
international law privately actionable).
177. See id. at 1677 (Breyer,J., concurring).
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Using the logic that international law should be the source of
corporate liability would also cause possible foreign policy
consequences because U.S. corporations would not be held liable for
extraterritorial violations of international law. Civilized nations must
widely accept a certain practice or conduct for it to become
customary international law, but there is no historical practice of
holding corporations liable for violations of international law." The
Second Circuit argued that the practice of holding corporations
liable for violating international law must be customary international
law for corporate liability to be cognizable under the ATS."' However,
prohibited conduct is what constitutes customary international law, not
the procedural aspect of who may be held liable for violating it. Further,
the lack of alternative sources of law that can adequately address
violations of international nonns means that, if the Second Circuit's
original line of reasoning is followed, U.S. corporations would
automatically escape liability for harming citizens of other nations, and
the ATS would have narrow applicability.so
Further, looking to international law as the source of corporate
liability under the ATS would result in the absence of a universality
requirement, meaning that fewer corporations would be held liable.
Although international law is the source of the violation, using it as
the source of liability would exclude corporations from being held
liable for violations of international law, contradicting the Ninth
Circuit's requirement that each international norm alleged is
applicable to corporations if it is universally applicable to individuals,
groups, and states."' Using international law as the source of liability
under the ATS would effectively create a bright-line rule of corporate
immunity-an unfair result and one undesirable under the Ninth
Circuit's corporate liability analysis."8
178. See supra note 46 (describing customary international law).
179. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 127, 132, 137 (2d Cir. 2010).
The Second Circuit's opinion was technically affirmed by the Supreme Court's
decision in Kiobel; however, because its corporate liability analysis was not explicitly
rejected or accepted, it is still a valid argument.
180. See infra Part II.B.2.
181. Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014) (ruling that
norms that are universal, or applicable to all actors, can provide the basis for ATS
claims against corporations).
182. Alternatively, using state law to adjudicate violations of international law
would be an inadequate option as well. In Doe I v. Exxon Mobil Corp., the plaintiffs
failure to exhaust local remedies in Indonesia before bringing an action in federal
court in the United States was not a bar to ATS liability. 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 90
(D.D.C. 2014). The inference can be made that plaintiffs do not need to exhaust
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2. If U.S. corporate liability for overseas violations is precluded under the
A TS, the statute would be almost ineffective
Together, Kiobel and Sosa severely limited the application of the
ATS, rendering it applicable only to individual perpetrators, who
could be members of a corporation, as long as the conduct alleged
was not extraterritorial.'" Kiobel significantly limited available legal
remedies for violations of human rights norms by foreign
corporations because of the presumption against extraterritoriality.' 8 '
Even before Kiobel, the Court in Sosa found no specific, universal, and
obligatory norm that held foreign corporations liable for violations of
international law." If that limitation on foreign corporations is
combined with the inability to hold U.S. corporations liable for overseas
conduct, the pool of people subject to liability under the ATS becomes
very limited; it would, further, be more difficult to prove individual
liability of an employee or director of a corporation rather than liability
of the corporation as a whole. It does not seem reasonable to assume
that Congress passed the ATS with the intent that its applicability be so
limited when viewed in light of the reasons for passing the statute.' 86
Corporate liability can exist under the ATS when extraterritorial
conduct is involved. The presumption of extraterritoriality that the
Supreme Court outlines in Kiobel is based on the idea that Congress
legislates with respect to domestic matters rather than foreign.'
However, the presumption against extraterritoriality is not related to
the analysis of corporate liability, and Congress enacted the ATS with
foreign, not just domestic, matters in mind because of: (1) its
local remedies in the United States before bringing a federal claim. This assertion is
further supported by Professor Roger P. Alford, who argues that although alternative
sources of law exist, they do not provide the same direct relief as the ATS, and the
possibility of success under sources such as state laws is slim. Alford, supra note 128,
at 1749; see infra notes 228-36, 238 and accompanying text (detailing Alford's
arguments regarding alternative sources of law, including state statutes that regulate
unfair business and consumer fraud).
183. See Bird et al., supra note 25, at 608-09.
184. See id. at 617.
185. Id. at 608.
186. See supra Part I.B.1 (detailing the reasons for passing the ATS). Piracy was a
violation of the law of nations at the time the ATS was passed; because piracy
necessarily occurs in foreign territory but, at the same time, is grounds for ATS
jurisdiction, it does not logically follow that the presumption against
extraterritoriality should prevent ATS liability for corporations that act similarly to
pirates in that they commit the same kinds of acts. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co.,
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1672-73 (2013) (Breyer,J., concurring).
187. Kiobel 133 S. Ct. at 1672 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Morrison v. Nat'l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010)).
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reference to aliens, treaties, and the law of nations;' (2) its purpose
of addressing violations of the law of nations and therefore judicial
remedies for international laws;' 89 and (3) one of the three original
violations Congress passed the ATS to combat, piracy, occurs
abroad.'" Further, the ATS is meant to address international law
because it has historically been used to apply universally accepted
international norms to violators who attempt to avoid liability by
doing business in the United States.'
Therefore, several inferences can be made regarding the
extraterritorial application of the ATS. First, holding U.S.
corporations liable for violations of international norms committed
overseas does not involve the types of serious international affairs
conflicts Congress may have imagined at the time of enactment.
Congress necessarily intended the ATS to have some international
application because of its wording, purpose, and reasons for
enactment, and when a U.S. corporation is held liable by the U.S.
Government for inflicting harm on foreigners, it does not logically
follow that foreign policy is implicated.'" Second, because Congress
passed the ATS with at least some extraterritorial application in
188. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." (emphasis added)).
189. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
190. Kiobel4 133 S. Ct. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring); see supra note 186
(explaining that piracy occurs abroad, so the ATS should apply abroad).
191. Katie Redford, Door Still Open for Human Rights Claims After Kiobel,
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 17, 2013, 6:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/
commentary-door-still-open-for-human-rights-claims-after-kiobel.
192. See Irit Tamir, Child Laborers Bring Case Against Food Companies: "You're Enabling
Enslavement", POLrICS OF POVERTY (Sept. 26, 2014), http://politicsofpoverty.
oxfamamerica.org/2014/09/child-laborers-bring-case-food-companies-youre-
enabling-enslavement (stating that finding the defendants in Doe I v. Nestle U.S.A.,
Inc. liable could impact how wages and working conditions factor into companies'
business models, but not contemplating any impact such a finding would have on
U.S. foreign policy); see also William O'Brien et al., Ninth Circuit to Corporations-No
Blanket Immunity for Violations of International Law, McKENNA LONG & ALDRIDGE LLP
(Sept. 23, 2014) (on file with author) (listing several implications of Nestle on ATS
corporate liability, none of which include an impact on U.S. foreign policy). It could
be argued that because corporations that would be found liable under the ATS are
likely employing foreign actors to achieve their foreign business objectives-such as
in Nestle, which involved the conduct of Ivory Coast officials-foreign policy is
implicated. However, U.S. courts will only be looking at what the U.S. corporation
did or directed and any ruling against the corporation would not necessarily have
any effect on the foreigners involved, thereby implicating only U.S. interests and not
causing any foreign policy consequences for the U.S. government.
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mind, excluding U.S. corporations from liability under the ATS
would render the statute relatively ineffective. For example, in both
Balintulo and Chiquita, U.S. corporations entirely escaped liability for
violating the international norms of apartheid and torture,
respectively.' 93 However, if the Second and Eleventh Circuits applied
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the plaintiffs would have had recourse
and the corporations would have faced responsibility for committing
such heinous human rights violations.' Therefore, because
Congress intended the ATS to apply internationally and could not
reasonably have intended the statute to have very limited application,
corporate liability under the ATS may exist where U.S. corporations
commit violations of international norms in foreign countries.
3. Basing corporate liability on the location of the conduct, rather than on
the kind of violation, encourages corporations to circumvent liability by
violating international norms in foreign countries, thereby essentially
precluding U.S. corporate liability altogether
Applying the presumption of extraterritoriality to ATS litigation
creates an incentive for U.S. corporations to move their operations
overseas. The presumption of extraterritoriality assumes that statutes
that do not clearly indicate application abroad are not applicable
outside of the United States.'9 However, the presumption would be
overcome if violations of international norms occurred in the United
States.'96  If courts ignore the first half of the Ninth Circuit's
analysis-the determination of applicability of the norm to the
corporation l7- because the conduct occurred outside the United
States, they will create an incentive for corporations to violate
international norms overseas instead. Foreign companies that do
business in the United States will be able to use Kiobel to escape
liability, and, at the same time, Kiobel encourages U.S. corporations to
move their operations outside the United States so they can do the
193. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining how these corporations escaped liability
under the ATS).
194. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing that by applying the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-
norm analysis to Balintulo and Chiquita, cases very similar to Nestle, the defendant-
U.S.-corporations would face liability for their actions under the ATS).
195. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
196. See id. at 1669 (ruling that ATS jurisdiction did not exist because all relevant
conduct took place outside the United States, therefore implying that if relevant
conduct occurred in the United States, the Court might have found jurisdiction); see
also Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2014)
(same); Balintulo v. Daimler A.G., 727 F.3d 174, 189-90 (2d Cir. 2013) (same).
197. Doe Iv. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1022 (9th Cir. 2014).
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same.'" Additionally, the purpose of the ATS is to prevent conflicts
of foreign policy.'" If it is perceived that U.S. law encourages U.S.
corporations to carry out violations of international norms overseas to
avoid liability, the legislative intent behind the ATS is subverted.
C. The Negative Implications of Letting U.S. Corporations Evade Liability
Through a Bright Line Corporate Immunity Rule Outweigh the Ease of Such a Rule
Even though a bright-line rule precluding U.S. corporate liability
when all relevant conduct occurs overseas would result in easy
application and uniform decisions,20 0 the negative implications of
letting U.S. corporations evade liability must be understood to
outweigh the ease of such a bright-line rule. The United States will
become a safe harbor for corporate criminals if "mere corporate
presence, 20' including incorporation, in the United States is enough
to preclude corporate liability.202 Without the possibility of recovery
against U.S. corporations under the ATS, plaintiffs are faced with
limited alternative methods of recovery that provide dubious
198. See Redford, supra note 191 ("[T]he majority's reasoning overlooks the strong
reasons against holding U.S. companies to a higher standard than foreign companies
who do business ... here.").
199. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664-65.
200. Although not the focus of this Comment, helpful context is provided by
understanding that most courts have focused on a version of a bright-line rule in
trying to determine whether the alleged conduct sufficiently touched and concerned
the United States to displace the presumption. See Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1022
(remanding to the District Court to determine, under domestic law, whether
recovery from the corporation is permissible in terms of, for example: joint or
several liability, damages computation, and proximate causation); Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 97 (D.D.C. 2014) (allowing plaintiffs to amend their
complaint to restate their ATS claims and allege additional facts showing their claims
sufficiently touch and concern the United States to displace the presumption). The
Exxon court, by allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint, implied that what
had previously been alleged-only U.S. corporate citizenship-would not be
sufficient to touch and concern the United States. Exxon Mobil, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 96;
see also In re S. Mr. Apartheid Litig., 56 F. Supp. 3d 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), affd,
Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 171 (2d Cir. 2015). On the other end of
the spectrum are the circumstances in Al Shimari, where the court found sufficient
connection to the United States. Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d
516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014); see supra Part I.C.2 (explaining the details of Al Shimari).
The circumstances of this case obviously implicated U.S. territory and citizens
sufficiently to allow jurisdiction under the ATS, but when compared to cases such as
Exxon, In re South Affican, Balintuto, or Chiquita, the facts seem to be on the extreme
end of the spectrum of conduct that touches and concerns the United States. See
supra Part I.C (detailing the facts of each case).
201. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
202. See infra Part II.C.1.
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prospects of success.203 The presumption of extraterritoriality does not
directly apply to the ATS, 201 so the presumption should not be
determinative of corporate liability under the ATS; rather, its principles
should only be a consideration in the corporate liability analysis.205
Finally, Kiobel does not necessarily reject U.S. corporate liability for
extraterritorial violations of international law because the Supreme
Court did not explicitly reject or accept the Second Circuit's original
reasons for dismissing the case, and the Court did not fully explain the
meaning or application of its new "touch and concern" test. 201
1. The United States would become a safe haven for corporations in which to
have a 'presence" or incorporate to escape liability
The United States' interest against becoming a safe harbor for
violators of international norms should be treated as a jurisdictional
interest, which, therefore, justifies the use of the ATS, a jurisdictional
statute. Nothing in the statute or in United States history suggests
that U.S. courts should ignore international crime victims. 2 0 Justice
Breyer's concurrence in Kiobel states that liability under the ATS
should occur, among two other situations, 208 where the defendant's
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important U.S. national
interest, including a distinct interest in preventing the United States
from becoming a safe harbor, free of criminal and civil liability, for a
torturer or other enemy.20 Justice Breyer additionally argued that the
proper restriction on the use of the ATS should be providing
jurisdiction only where distinct American interests are at issue,210 rather
than only providing jurisdiction where the conduct occurs in the United
203. See infra Part II.C.2.
204. The ATS is a jurisdictional statute, whereas the presumption against
extraterritoriality is applied to determine whether a statute regulating conduct
applies abroad. Kiobe, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
205. See infra Part II.C.3.
206. See infra Part II.C.4.
207. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Al Shimari v. CACI
Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014) (using the Torture Victim
Protection Act and 18 U.S.C. § 2340A to demonstrate that Congress intended to
prevent the United States from becoming a criminal and civil safe harbor for
torturers and other violators, and inferring that the same congressional intent
applies to the ATS because the Supreme Court knew about these statutes when it
decided Kiobel and mentioned its new "touch and concern" test).
208. Kiobe4 133 S. Ct. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (proposing to also find
jurisdiction under the ATS where: (1) the alleged tort occurs on U.S. soil, or (2) the
defendant is a U.S. national).
209. Id.
210. See id. at 1674.
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States, because the latter option leaves courts to decipher what conduct
sufficiently touches and concerns the United States." Without such a
safe harbor rule, U.S. corporations could easily evade liability under the
ATS merely by violating international law abroad.212
Further, international norms have historically included the duty to
prevent a nation from becoming a safe harbor for pirates and their
modern-day equivalents.21 1 Filartiga and In re Estate of Marcos, Human
Rights Litigation 1 4 held that the ATS claim in each case was proper,
even though the alleged conduct occurred overseas by foreign persons,
because the defendants were in the United States for a period of time
before being sued.21" The courts conferred jurisdiction in each case in
part because of America's interest in not providing safe harbor for
such defendants, thereby ensuring defendants would not be free of all
liability.216 While both of these cases were decided before Kiobel, in
neither case were the foreign defendants in the United States for very
long before the plaintiffs filed suit; thus, while the Court in Kiobel
stated that "mere. . . presence" of corporations is not enough
connection to the United States to satisfy the presumption against
extraterritoriality, mere presence of individuals in the United States
sufficed before the Court ever applied the presumption. Treating the
United States' strong interest against becoming a safe harbor for
criminals as a justification for ATS application accords with the
jurisdictional nature of the statute and is therefore a strong
justification for U.S. corporate liability under the ATS.
2. Without the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm analysis under the ATS, U.S.
corporations can easily avoid both U.S. and international law, and plaintiffs
would have very limited avenues for recovery
Without the Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm analysis under the ATS,
U.S. corporations would have a simple and effective way of avoiding
U.S. and international law. Further, without the possibility of recovery
211. Kiobeldid not explain what conduct would sufficiently touch and concern the
United States to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality. See id. at 1669.
212. Redford, supra note 191.
213. Kiobel 133 S. Ct. at 1674.
214. 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a successful ATS claim by
Filipino citizens against the former president of the Philippines for death by torture
that allegedly occurred abroad, where the former president had been living in
Hawaii for only one month before being sued).
215. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1675 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980) and In re Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1469, 1475).
216. Id.
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under the ATS, there are few alternative avenues of recovery for plaintiffs
to pursue, and these sparse options would provide only limited success.
Chiquita provides an example of how easily U.S. corporations can
evade repercussions for violating international norms. Chiquita was a
U.S. corporation, and the ATS was intended to create a cause of
action for torts committed by Americans outside the United States."'
The plaintiffs alleged that Chiquita committed a violation of
international law, actionable under the ATS, by authorizing payments
to paramilitary groups in Colombia used to torture the plaintiffs."'
The majority's decision to dismiss the case, therefore, leaves innocent
people without recourse against U.S. corporations that engage in
violations of international norms abroad. 219
Scholars have suggested that Kiobel substantially limited plaintiffs'
abilities to file ATS claims in federal court. For example, Professor
Donald Childress argues that it is unlikely that most plaintiffs would
succeed in suing a U.S. corporation under the ATS for conduct
committed outside the United States for two reasons.220 First,
Childress asserts that U.S. domicile is closer to "mere corporate
presence," which does not overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality, than to conduct, which does."' Second, he
reminds us that the presumption is about the location of the conduct,
not the identity of the defendant.' While the arguments seem
persuasive, it is difficult to believe that Congress would have passed a
statute with the intent that it apply only to a very small area of the
law." Further, because the presumption does not neatly apply to a
jurisdictional statute like the ATS, it should not be applied so rigidly
as to be the sole determinant of corporate liability under the ATS.1 4
217. Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int'l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1193 (11th Cir. 2014)
(Martin, J., dissenting).
218. John Bellinger, Two New ATS Decisions: Fourth and Eleventh Circuits Split on
Whether Claims Against CACI and Chiquita "Touch and Concern" the Territory of the United
States, LAWFARE (July 27, 2014, 8:53 PM), http://www.1awfareblog.com/2014/07/two-
new-ats-decisions-fourth-and-eleventh-circuits-split-on-whether-claims-against-caci-
and-chiquita-touch-and-concern-the-territory-of-the-united-states.
219. Growing Circuit Split overATS Suits Against CoiporationsFolloingKiobel, INT'L L. PROF.
BLOG (Aug. 5, 2014), http://awprofessors.typepad.com/international
law/2014/08/growing-circuit-split-over-atssuits-against-corporationsfollowing-kiobel.html.
220. Childress, supra note 126.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. See supra Part II.B.2.
224. See infra Part II.C.3.
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Childress further argues that plaintiffs would not prevail under the
ATS even when the injury occurred abroad but some tortious
conduct occurred in the United States that itself violated the law of
nations.225 He concludes that plaintiffs can only proceed under the
ATS when they are injured in the United States, or when substantial
activities occur in the United States that violate the law of nations
even though the injury happened abroad.2 2 ' However, if the
Supreme Court's "touch and concern" language in Kiobel literally
meant that conduct must touch the United States, which Childress
implies, extraterritoriality would not be an issue to rebut and the
presumption would not apply, ultimately invalidating any party's use
of the argument that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially, as well
as the Supreme Court's mention of the touch and concern test.22 7
Alternatives to the ATS exist, but there are few and provide only
uncertain success for plaintiffs. Alternatives include the Torture
Victim Protection Act (TVPA), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), and state laws, including state statutes that
regulate unfair business practices and consumer fraud.22 1 However,
these alternatives present plaintiffs with little chance of success.
Under the TVPA, claims must be brought against individuals acting
under the color of authority of the foreign state, meaning that
corporations or corporate officials who conspired or acted with
foreign governments are excluded from TVPA liability.229
225: Childress, supra note 126 (positing that a claim that a U.S. corporate official
directed corporate agents in a foreign country to take action that allegedly violated
the law of nations would be unsuccessful unless the action of directing corporate
officials to carry out the illegal conduct violates an international norm).
226. Id.
227. See Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Comnentary: The Door Remains Open to "Foreign
Squared" Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2013/04/kiobel-commentary-the-door-remains-open-to-foreign-squared-cases
(explaining that, regarding the meaning of touch and concern, "[i]t cannot be that
the claim must literally 'touch' U.S. soil, for then extraterritoriality would clearly not
be at issue"); Kristen Linsley Myles & James Rutten, Kiobel Commentary: Answers ...
and More Questions, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 18, 2013, 2:07 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentary-kiobel-answers-and-more-
questions (" [I]f conduct violating the law of nations takes place in the United States,
the presumption against extraterritoriality is irrelevant because the conduct would
not be extraterritorial in the first place.").
228. Alford, supra note 128, at 1749.
229. Id. at 1756.
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Success under RICO is not as unreachable as under the TVPA, but it
is uncertain.2 10 Courts either treat RICO as focusing on the location of
the enterprise or both the location and impact of the conduct of the
enterprise.23 ' Because the presumption against extraterritoriality applies
to RICO claims and it is unclear how RICO would apply to a domestic
enterprise whose effects are felt abroad," a plaintiffs success would be
as uncertain under RICO as it currently is under the ATS.
While plaintiffs succeed more easily under state statutes regulating
unfair business practices and consumer fraud,3 they would not
directly recover for their actual injuries. Claims in such cases are
based on injuries to competitors of defendant-corporations or to
consumers deceived by misrepresentations about the corporation's
human rights record, rather than on injuries to the foreign human
rights victims. 2 3' Therefore, while plaintiffs in these cases are likely to
prevail, the victims themselves will not directly recover as they would
if they prevailed on an ATS claim.
One scholar further suggests that federal common law claims
under the ATS could be brought in federal court exercising diversity
jurisdiction or state court exercising general jurisdiction.236 However,
the Supreme Court applied the presumption to a jurisdictional
statute in Kiobel only because of the importance of avoiding adverse
foreign policy consequences of adjudicating violations of
international norms; therefore, it is possible that an attempt to
circumvent this rule by bringing such causes of action under diversity
or general jurisdiction would be treated similarly or be considered
230. See id. at 1757 (describing the uncertainty about whether the presumption
against extraterritoriality, as applied to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) claims, requires evidence of a domestic enterprise or of a
pattern of domestic racketeering activity).
231. Id. "To state a claim under RICO, plaintiffs must allege (1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity." Id. at 1756.
232. Id. at 1757.
233. See id. at 1759 (explaining such success in Doe v. Unoca4 where the plaintiffs
succeeded after alleging that a California corporation was involved in unfair business
practices when it subjected villagers in Burma to forced labor, murder, rape, and
torture; the court held that such a claim could be brought for injuries outside the
United States as long as some wrongful conduct occurred within the state, such as
fundamental policy decisions (internal citations omitted)).
234. Id. at 1760.
235. See id. at 1761 (citing an example of labor groups successfully suing Nike for
contracting with sweatshop suppliers, where the sweatshop laborers were not the
direct beneficiaries of the settlement).
236. Id. at 1769.
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illegal as a direct contravention of Kiobel.2 1' Further, while it may be
true that state courts exercising general jurisdiction create and apply
federal common law," the Court's emphasis in Sosa and Kiobel on the
limited circumstances in which causes of action can be recognized
under federal common law under the ATS suggests that state courts
would be unfit to hear such claims.
3. In determining corporate liability under the A TS, the presumption
against extraterritoriality should not be determinative, and its underlying
principles should only be a consideration
The presumption against extraterritoriality is traditionally applied
to substantive statutes,' so it should not determine corporate
liability under the ATS, a jurisdictional statute. Additionally, the
principles underlying the presumption-avoidance of unintended
foreign policy consequences and infringement on the executive and
legislative branches' management of foreign affairsM"-should be a
consideration in, but not determinative of, corporate liability.
Courts apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to
determine whether an Act regulating conduct applies abroad,"
reflecting the idea that Congress legislates with domestic, not foreign,
matters in mind."' Even the majority in Kiobel recognized that the
ATS is a jurisdictional statute that does not regulate conduct-it only
allows federal courts to recognize and hear certain limited causes of
action based on universal norms of international law."' In light of
this discrepancy, the majority justified its application of the
presumption against extraterritoriality to the ATS by reasoning that
the principles underlying the presumption apply to the ATS and
serve to warn courts to be cautious when considering whether causes
of action can be brought under the statute.2 " However, the
majority's use of the presumption does not work because the
237. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 n.19 (2004) (explaining that
while grants ofjurisdiction to federal courts under the ATS allow limited development of
federal common law, the same is not true forjurisdiction granted under federal question
jurisdiction); see also Alford, supra note 128, at 1769 ("If the Sosa causes of action do not
create federal question jurisdiction, there is no reason to think those same federal causes
of action could be brought under diversityjurisdiction.").
238. Alford, supra note 128, at 1769.
239. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 1672 (Breyer,J., concurring).
243. Id. at 1665.
244. Id.
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presumption is generally applied to the substantive content of laws
regulating conduct," 5 and there are strong indications that the ATS
was enacted with foreign matters in mind, not just domestic.246
Therefore, because the presumption of extraterritoriality does not
directly apply to the ATS, the principles underlying it should be only
a consideration in the determination of corporate liability, rather
than determinative of it. The principles underlying the presumption
relate to its purpose: protecting against disputes between U.S. law
and the laws of other countries.24 7 To prevent unintended foreign
policy consequences, it is important to be able to determine whether
Congress expressly intended an Act to apply abroad .24  Additionally,
the presumption works to prevent impingement by courts on the
executive and legislative branches' management of foreign affairs.2 1
The court in Al Shimari recognized that the principle of avoiding
unintended foreign policy consequences is irrelevant where the
plaintiffs are claiming violations of international norms because the
ATS is jurisdictional rather than conduct-related, and, therefore, any
claims asserted under the ATS are recognized by other nations,
eliminating the possibility of foreign policy consequences.5 o
The Ninth Circuit, in discussing whether the plaintiffs' claims are
barred by the presumption, references the alarming vagueness of the
Supreme Court's discussion of extraterritorial ATS claims."' In pointing
out that Kiobel "makes clear that the general principles underlying the
presumption against extraterritoriality apply to ATS claims, but ... leaves
245. Id. at 1664; see also Hathaway, supra note 227 (stating that courts have typically
applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the substantive content of laws);
Myles & Rutten, supra note 227 (explaining that the presumption is substantively applied to
determine whether a federal statute regulates conduct abroad).
246. Kiobel 133 S. Ct. at 1672; see supra Part II.B.1 (detailing why the ATS was
passed with foreign matters in mind); cf Hathaway, supra note 227 (arguing that the
majority opinion in Kiobel ignored the rationale that piracy, one of the original ATS
claims accepted by the Supreme Court, was a violation of the law of nations and that
allowing such a claim only enforced international law and did not impose the
sovereign will of the United States on foreigners who committed violations abroad;
therefore, adjudicating universally recognized norms under the ATS is comparable
and the ATS should not be limited by the presumption).
247. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 529-30 (4th Cir. 2014)
(further illustrating that there is no issue of bringing foreign defendants to U.S. courts to
litigate conduct committed abroad when the defendants are U.S. citizens).
251. Doe Iv. Nestle U.S.A., Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1027 (9th Cir. 2014).
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important questions about extraterritorial ATS claims unresolved[,]" 2
the Ninth Circuit seems to have understood that these principles should
be considered when deciding whether the alleged conduct displaces the
presumption, but should not be determinative of whether the
international norm at issue applies to corporate liability. 53
D. Kiobel Does Not Reject U.S. Corporate Liability for Violations of
International Norms Committed Overseas
Following Kiobel, an understanding spread throughout the lower
courts that the presumption against extraterritoriality, as applied to
the ATS, rejected the argument that ATS suits could be brought
against U.S. corporations for overseas violations of international
law.' This was derived from the more general notion that Kiobel
unanimously rejected the more than thirty-year interpretation that
the ATS allowed global remedies for international law violations.25 5
Further, because the Supreme Court stated that "relief for
violations of the law of nations occurring outside the United States
is barred," it followed that extraterritoriality depended on the
location of the conduct rather than the citizenship of the
defendant.25' Therefore, claims against U.S. corporations for
extraterritorial violations would likely be barred as well. 5
However, this argument ignores the fact that the Court conditioned
the presumption on whether the alleged conduct sufficiently touches and
concerns the United States25' and also ignores the specific facts of the
case: none of the parties in Kiobel had a connection to the United
States.25" Further, this argument conflates the separate issues of corporate
252. Id.
253. See id. The Ninth Circuit was likely implying that the presumption and its
underlying principles should only be considered in the second step of the circuit's
two-step analysis.
254. See Meir Feder, Why the Court Unanimously Jettisoned Thirty Years of Lower Court
Precedent (and What That Can Tell Us About How to Read Kiobel), SCOTUSBLOG (Apr.
19, 2013, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/04/commentary-why-the-
court-unanimously-jettisoned-thirty-years-of-lower-court-precedent-and-what-that-can-
tell-us-about-how-to-read-kiobel (claiming that, after Kiobe4 because the
extraterritoriality analysis depends on the location of the conduct rather than the
citizenship of the defendant, ATS suits against U.S. corporations for committing
violations of international law overseas are essentially barred).
255. Id.
256. Id. (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013)).
257. Id.
258. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
259. Id. at 1662.
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liability and the presumption against extraterritoriality, treating them as
intertwined in one analysis rather than as distinct questions. While the
presumption against extraterritoriality analysis might ultimately free a
corporation of liability, the initial corporate liability analysis must be
performed first to give the ATS its full strength and uphold the
supporting legislative intent. Therefore, ATS claims against U.S.
corporations for extraterritorial violations of international norms are not
necessarily barred following Kiobel
E. Recommendations
The Ninth Circuit's norm-by-norm analysis should be adopted in
determining corporate liability under the ATS. If a court observes
that a norm applies to states, individuals, and groups, then the norm
is universal; therefore it is applicable to corporations. Universal
norms can provide the basis for ATS claims against U.S. corporations.
To determine whether a norm is universal, courts should consider:
(1) whether the norm is limited to states, and (2) whether the
application depends on the perpetrator's identity. Universal norms are
applicable to corporations, and when the applicability of the norm
depends on the victims' identities, corporations may be held liable. In
sum, the test that should be applied is whether international law extends
an international norm against an act to the perpetrator in question,
because it is inconsistent with the universality of international norms to
allow avoidance of liability just by incorporating.
Further, the presumption against extraterritoriality should apply in
the norm-by-norm analysis only to the extent the reasons underlying it
are implicated, that is, when the adjudication of an ATS claim will
interfere with the laws of another nation. However, when a U.S.
corporation violates international norms, a strong connection with the
United States exists, and corporations must not be allowed to escape
liability based on a presumption not normally applied to jurisdictional
statutes. Therefore, displacement of the presumption against
extraterritorial application should not be a determinant of whether a
corporation is liable. This proposition follows from the fact that the only
international implication of U.S. corporate liability for extraterritorial
violation of international norms would be that federal courts would stop
the harm caused to citizens of another country by a U.S. entity.
Finally, Justice Breyer's test from his concurrence in Kiobel should
be an element of determining U.S. corporate liability once the norm-
by-norm analysis has been performed. Finding ATS liability where:
(1) the alleged tort occurs in the United States; (2) the defendant is a
U.S. citizen; or (3) the defendant's conduct substantially and
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adversely effects an important U.S. interest, including the interest in
not becoming a safe harbor for those who violate international law,
effectively helps adjudication of whether the alleged conduct should
fall under U.S. jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Due to Kiobel's vague language, a circuit split emerged between the
Second and Eleventh Circuits, and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits. 2o
While the Second and Eleventh Circuits interpreted Kiobel to
preclude domestic corporate liability when the relevant conduct
occurred outside the United States,"' the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
held that there can be liability for U.S. corporations that
extraterritorially violate international norms."' The Fourth Circuit
expanded on the Supreme Court's "touch and concern" test by
analyzing whether the alleged conduct had sufficient connections to
the United States to overcome the presumption."' The Ninth Circuit
instead adopted a norm-by-norm analysis to determine whether each
alleged universal norm applies to corporations; if so, corporations face
ATS liability, and may ultimately be held liable under the ATS for that
claim if a court then determines that recovery is permissible."
U.S. corporate liability should be determined using a norm-by-
norm analysis to ensure uniformity and that corporations are not
given special treatment. Further, jurisdiction for extraterritorial torts
committed by U.S. corporations should arise under the ATS;
otherwise the ATS would be almost ineffective, courts would make
non-uniform decisions that could interfere with foreign policy, and
without corporate liability under the ATS, an incentive is created for
U.S. corporations to simply move or keep their operations overseas
instead of stopping practices that violate international norms. The
policy implications of letting U.S. corporations escape liability are
also substantial. The United States would become a safe haven for
corporations that violate international law, and plaintiffs would be
left with limited, and most likely ineffective alternatives for recovery.
260. See supra Part I.C (detailing the circuit split that emerged after Kiobel between
the Second and Eleventh, and the Fourth and Ninth, Circuits).
261. See supra Part I.C.1 (detailing how the Second and Eleventh Circuits reasoned
that U.S. corporations may not be held liable under the ATS for overseas violations
of international law).
262. See supra Part I.C.2 (detailing how the Fourth and Ninth Circuits concluded
that U.S. corporate liability for overseas conduct exists under the ATS).
263. See supra Part I.C.2 (explaining the Fourth Circuit's decision in Al Shimari).
264. See supra Part I.C.2.a (explaining the Ninth Circuit's decision in Nestle).
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Due to the Ninth Circuit's unique approach to corporate liability
under the ATS, the three former child slaves have hopes of being
vindicated after suffering forced child slavery and constant threats of
torture. If the norm-by-norm analysis is applied in the future, U.S.
corporations will likely be forced to acknowledge and take
responsibility for the shocking crimes they commit overseas. The
victims of a campaign of torture and murder in Colombia caused by
Chiquita, and the victims of apartheid in South Africa caused by IBM
and Ford, will never directly recover under the ATS for the injustices
they suffered. However, there is increased likelihood of success for the
victims of child slavery in the Ivory Coast because the Ninth Circuit's
norm-by-norm corporate liability analysis will allow the possibility of
holding U.S. corporations liable whenever U.S. interests are involved,
resulting in the most comprehensive, fair, and uniform outcomes.
